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Abstract
This article summarizes human rights under the Ethiopian Constitution (mainly 
surrounding Chapter 3 of Constitution and related constitutional provisions on 
human and democratic rights), and forwards some insights. It, inter alia, covers 
various aspects of the application and interpretation of human rights provisions, 
limitation and derogation from protected rights, the amendment procedure and 
constitutional adjudicatory jurisdiction. The relevance attached to international 
and regional human rights instruments and their status in the Ethiopian 
hierarchy of laws is noted. Although there are some references to factual 
situations, the article primarily considers the constitutional landscape. The 
article thus attempts to cover a wider spectrum of issues, and its purpose is not 
to discuss each issue in detail, but to forward an overview and offer some 
insights.
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Introduction
Ethiopia had three written constitutions (in 1931, 1955 and 1987) before the 
1995 FDRE Constitution. The 1931 Constitution* 1 does not have significant 
relevance for the human rights discourse as it was primarily designed to reaffirm 
and fortify the absolute power of Emperor Haile Selassie I.2 The state was 
generally not understood to owe duties to its subjects.3 The 1955 Constitution4
* LLB (Jimma University); LLM: Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria; 
Doctor of Laws Candidate, Researcher and Tutor, Centre for Human Rights, Faculty 
of Law, University of Pretoria..
1 Constitution of Ethiopia, (adopted in July 1931). The absence of written constitutions 
before 1931 does not however mean that there were no (unwritten) constitutions.
2 For more discussion see, Fasil Nahum (1997), A Constitution for a Nation of Nations: 
The Ethiopian Prospect (Red Sea Press) at 21 (See generally Chapter 2).
3 T Regassa (2009) “Making Legal Sense of Human Rights: The Judicial Role in 
Protecting Human Rights in Ethiopia”, 3(2) Mizan Law Review 287, at 297; see also 
CN Paul & C Clapham (1972), Ethiopian Constitutional Development: A Sourcebook, 
Addis Abeba University Press)
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was adopted in response to the inadequacy of the 1931 Constitution to 
accommodate the more complex legal and political scenario at domestic and 
international levels. Although this Constitution recognized a handful of rights, 
their relevance was vastly compromised due to the absolute power of the 
Emperor, and the absence of an organ empowered to interpret and apply the 
Constitution.4 5 Besides, most of the rights were entangled with claw-back 
clauses.6
The military junta (which called itself the Dergue, which literally means 
Committee) took power after dethroning Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974, and 
it adopted a Constitution in 1987 after 13 years of constitutional lacuna. The 
1987 Constitution7 highly accentuates economic, social and cultural rights due 
mainly to the socialist tendency of the regime. it was nonetheless a regime beset 
by fear and there was no fertile ground to foster the recognition and exercise of 
human rights.8
The current Ethiopian Constitution entered into force on 21 August 1995.9 in 
a stark break from its predecessors, the FDRE Constitution establishes an ethnic 
based federal state consisting of regional states delineated on the basis of 
settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned.10 
The Constitution also represents a major breakthrough in terms of human rights. 
it was crafted to respond to the underlying causes that triggered the widespread
4 Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 149 of 1955.
5 See generally G Krzeczunowicz (1984), ‘Hierarchy of laws’ 1(1) Journal of Ethiopian 
Law, 11
6 T Regassa, supra note 3 above, at 298.
7 Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, adopted 22 February 
1987.
8 In addition to the four Constitutions alluded to, Ethiopia also had the 1991 Transitional 
Period Charter of Ethiopia which organized the Transitional Government between 22 
July 1991 and 21 August 1995. This Charter recognized ‘freedom, equal rights and 
self-determination of all the peoples’ as its governing principles.
9 There is no indication that the Constitution or any of its elements were inspired by 
constitutions in other parts of the world. Nonetheless, the human rights provisions of 
the Constitution must have been highly influenced by the development internationally.
10 See FDRE Constitution arts 1, 46 and 47. Currently, there are nine regional states and 
two city states under federal administration, Addis Abeba and Dire Dawa. Each level 
of government, Federal and Regional, has its own legislative, executive and judicial 
structures. The judicial structure is composed of first instance, high court and 
supreme courts at the federal level and in each regional state.
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conflict and the ultimate downfall of the Dergue military junta in 1991. It 
addresses the volatile issues of ethnicity and self-determination.11
It is with this mindset that the drafters of the Constitution articulated the 
common objective of “building a political community founded on the rule of 
law and capable of ensuring a lasting peace guaranteeing a democratic order”.12 
unlike its predecessor which vehemently promoted a unitary system, the current 
Constitution emphasizes, tolerates and even encourages diversity and attempts 
to address it through an ethnic-based federal system. The relevance accorded to 
human rights is reflected from the outset by the preamble of the FDRE 
Constitution which emphatically affirms “the full respect for individual and 
people’s fundamental rights” as a condition precedent and foundational 
principles for the success of this sparkling ambition.13
The article presents an overview of the peculiar features and application of 
the Ethiopian Constitution regarding human rights and briefly discusses issues 
of interpretation. Moreover, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution are 
highlighted followed by a brief discussion on restrictions, derogation during 
emergencies, amendment, adjudication and constitutional remedies.
1. Peculiar features and application of the Constitution 
(regarding human rights and freedoms)
The Constitution devotes more than one third of its content to provisions on 
fundamental human and people’s rights.14 Moreover, there are provisions that 
deal with national policy principles and objectives which either establish 
important guarantees or have direct relevance to the interpretation of 
fundamental rights. The Constitution imposes a responsibility and duty to the 
respect and enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms at all levels of the 
federal and state legislative, executive and judicial bodies.15
The Constitution further elevates the horizon of human rights through 
reference to international and regional human rights instruments as thresholds
11 See the preamble which starts, ‘We the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia’. 
The Constitution serves as an expression of sovereignty which resides in nations, 
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution Art. 8).
12 FDRE Constitution, preamble, para 1.
13 FDRE Constitution, preamble, para 2 & 5.
14 See FDRE Constitution, Chapter 3, Arts. 13 - 44.
15 See FDRE Constitution, Art. 13(1) - this reinforces the supremacy of the Constitution 
and the general responsibility and duty the Constitution imposes on “all citizens, 
organs of state, political organizations, other associations as well as their officials” to 
obey and ensure its observance (Arts 9(1) and (2)).
44 Mizan Law Review Vol. 5 No.1, Spring 2011
for the interpretation of its human rights provisions.16 Another prominent feature 
is the implicit recognition of the independence, interrelatedness and 
indivisibility of all generations of human rights by incorporating them on equal 
footing without any difference in consequence.17
in terms of substantive guarantees, the Ethiopian Constitution is the only one 
in Africa to recognize the right to self-determination of “nations, nationalities 
and peoples”.18 This right extends up to creating regional states within the 
federal state and can even extend up to secession under the conditions stated in 
the Constitution. However, the exercise of the right to secession has not so far 
been seriously considered by any of the regions although a demand for secession 
has been espoused by some rebel groups.19
The Constitution also establishes separate procedures for the amendment of 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms.20 To avoid any possible regression 
and safeguard the gains, a more stringent and rigorous procedure is required to 
amend the provisions relating to the fundamental rights and freedoms than the 
remaining parts of the Constitution. 21 The Constitution fortifies these features 
through the supremacy clause under Article 9(1).
Application relates to who is bound to comply with the obligations that rights 
create. it helps to determine who may stand to be guilty of violating human 
rights. At a macro level, constitutions generally regulate the relationship 
between the state and its subjects, and amongst the state institutions themselves 
(vertical application). At a micro level, fundamental rights and freedoms delimit
16 See FDRE Constitution, Art. 13(2).
17 This is in conformity with the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights 
(para 5), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which affirms 
indivisibility of all kinds of rights in the preamble (adopted 27 June 1981, Preamble 
Para 6). For a detailed discussion see H Steiner & P Aliston International Human 
Rights in Context: Law Politics, and Morals (2nd ed, 2000, Oxford University Press). 
The three generation of rights are first generation civil and political rights, second 
generation economic, social and cultural rights, and third generation group rights.
18 See also C Heyns and W Kagoungo (2006), ‘Constitutional human rights law in 
Africa’ (22) South African Journal of Human Rights 673, at 678. See FDRE 
Constitution, Art. 39(1).
19 The Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front are examples 
in this regard. There is better tolerance for internal self-determination: for instance, 
the Silte exercised their right to internal self determination.
20 For the procedures of amendment see FDRE Constitution, Arts. 105(1) and (2).
21 For a detailed discussion of the safeguards and procedure of amendment see item (G) 
below.
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relationships between and among subjects themselves (horizontal application).22 
Most constitutions often anticipate and predominantly consider and regulate the 
vertical application of rights. Some progressive constitutions however also have 
desirously acknowledged horizontal application of human rights.23
In the Ethiopian Constitution, the Chapter that deals with human rights only 
explicitly recognizes their vertical application.24 The absence of mention of 
other entities in the same Chapter that deal with human and fundamental rights 
has led some to conclude that the Constitution is one of a handful of African 
constitutions that contain application clauses but do not recognize horizontal 
application of rights.25
A holistic and purposive view at the Constitution, however, reveals that even 
individuals and juristic persons are bound by the bill of rights. This is because 
the Constitution enjoins, though not exclusively concerning the bill of rights, 
“all citizens, organs of state, political organizations, other associations as well as
22 For a discussion of the vertical and horizontal application of rights and the theoretical 
and philosophical concepts that underlie horizontal application see generally DM 
Chirwa ‘In search of philosophical justifications and suitable models for the 
horizontal application of human rights’ 2008 8/2 African Human Rights Law Journal 
294; and JJ Paust ‘Human rights responsibilities of private corporations’ (2002) 35 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 801
23 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No 108 of 1996) provides an 
interesting example. Section 8(2) provides ‘A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a 
natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into account 
the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right’. This is a very 
broad and obscure standard which obviously necessitates a case by case and 
individualized consideration of each situation on its own facts - it is hardly possible 
to develop a general all-encompassing standard. The Constitutional Court of South 
Africa in one case referred to the ‘intensity of the right’, which itself is unclear and 
barely elaborative, as a determining factor - Case of Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) 
SA 401(CC). See also South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, 
Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC) ‘Business and Human Rights: The 
responsibilities of corporations for the protection and promotion of human rights’ 
(2008). For a discussion of the application of the bill of rights in the South African 
Constitution see I Currie & Johan de Waal The bill of rights handbook (5 th ed, 2005, 
Juta Publication) 30-78.
24 See FDRE Constitution, Art. 13(1) which imposes a duty to respect and enforce only 
on ‘All federal and state legislative, executive and judicial bodies’.
25 The other two are Burundi and Cape Verde. A total of 13 constitutions of African 
countries contain application provisions. See Heyns & Kagoungo “Constitutional 
Human Rights Law in Africa” supra note 18 above.
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their officials” to obey and ensure its observance.26 This clearly exacts 
compliance and imposes a duty on the listed persons and entities to obey and 
observe, inter alia, the fundamental human rights and freedoms stipulated under 
the Constitution.
2. Interpretation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
interpretation refers to the ascertaining or determination of the meaning of a 
legal provision.27 Contemporary constitutions generally provide that their bill of 
rights should be interpreted generously and holistically.28 The Ethiopian 
Constitution does not include a general interpretation clause whose application 
permeates all of its provisions. it does however contain a laudable interpretation 
clause regarding the chapter dealing with human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.29 Article 13(2) requires that the bill of rights “shall be interpreted in a 
manner conforming to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), international Covenants on Human Rights30 and international
26 See FDRE Constitution, Article 9(2). Note that the list does not include Non- 
Ethiopians as well as juristic persons established under the laws of other states. 
Considering the effects of globalization and the ever increasing presence of 
foreigners and the increasing role of foreign companies in the Ethiopian economy, an 
amendment may be necessary.
27 The power of interpreting the Constitution lies with the House of Federation, a 
political organ with semi-legislative power consisting of representatives of nations, 
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. Each nation, nationality and people has at least 
one representative and one more for each one million of its population. See arts 61­
66 of the FDRE Constitution.
28 See for instance Section 39 of the Constitution of South Africa. This provision further 
requires that the promotion of values that underlie open and democratic societies 
should guide the interpretation of the bill of rights. The Constitutional Court of South 
Africa has consistently reiterated this on several occasions; see for instance S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), and S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). More 
importantly, Art. 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR, adopted 16 December 1966 and entered into force 23 March 1976) and Art. 
5 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and entered into force 3 
January 1976) note that the provisions therein should not be interpreted to undermine 
other provisions or in a way that limits rights more than anticipated and permitted.
29 See FDRE Constitution, Art. 13(2).
30 Apparently, this seems to refer to the 1966 Covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR) which, 
together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, adopted 10 
December 1948) form the International Bill of Rights. The FDRE Constitution does 
not however succinctly determine the status of ratified international instruments in 
the Ethiopian hierarchy of laws. For more discussion on this, see I. Idris ‘The place of
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instruments adopted by Ethiopia”.31 It should be noted that the relevant 
instruments need not have been ratified by Ethiopia. However, the reference is 
limited to adopted instruments and does not include customary international law
per se32
The status of international instruments in general (and human rights 
instruments in particular) in the Constitution is not definite and is subject to 
academic debate. Article 9(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution declares the 
supremacy of the Constitution. Hence, a literal reading of this provision clearly 
indicates that international instruments, which, under Article 9(4), are made an 
integral part of the laws of the land upon ratification, are subordinate to the 
Constitution. Since human rights treaties are also part of a special kind of 
international agreements, they should be understood to be subordinate to the 
Constitution. However, the inclusion of the interpretation clause (Article 13/2 in 
relation to the fundamental rights chapter) has led some scholars to conclude 
that international human rights instruments adopted (and not just ratified) have a 
status higher than, or at least equal to, Chapter 3 of Constitution itself.33
International Human Rights Conventions in the 1994 Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Constitution’ (2000) 20 Journal of Ethiopian Law 113; and SA Yeshaneh 
‘The justiciability of human rights in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ 
(2008) 8/2 African Human Rights Law Journal 273.
31 ‘International instruments’ should be understood to include regional and sub-regional 
instruments as well. If the words ‘international instruments’ were not meant to 
include regional instruments, the reference to ‘International Covenants on Human 
Rights’ would have sufficed. The Constitution could have explicitly mentioned the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights especially as the African Charter 
(Article 21) is the only human rights instrument that unequivocally establishes the 
right to self-determination of peoples, which underpins the very foundation of the 
Ethiopian Constitution. For the application of this interpretation clause see Dr 
Negaso Gidada v the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of 
Federation, Federal High Court, Appeal, Addis Ababa, Judgment 4 January 2006 
which applied the UDHR (even though the Supreme Court rejected the ruling of this 
Court); and Miss Tsedale Demissie v Mr Kifle Demissie, Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division, File 23632, Judgment 6 November 2007 which applied 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989).
32 Similarly, Art 9(4) of the FDRE Constitution, which makes ratified instruments part 
of the law of the land, does not mention customary international law. Note that 
Article 9 is the interpretation provision whereas Article 13(1) is the incorporation 
provision.
33 Ibrahim Idris (2000) ‘The place of International Human Rights Conventions in the 
1994 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution’, 20 Journal of 
Ethiopian Law 113.
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Nevertheless, the Constitution only requires reference to the ‘principles'' - 
such as principles of universality, indivisibility and interdependency of all 
human rights, the duty to respect, to protect, to fulfill, and the principle that 
limitations of rights are the exceptions etc, rather than the provisions of 
international instruments which outline the specific rights to guide the 
interpretation of the provisions in the fundamental rights chapter. it also broadly 
refers to hard as well as soft instruments. Most importantly, conformity is 
required only when there is the need for interpretation which excludes cases 
where clear differences exist between the Constitution and international 
instruments as well as cases of clear constitutional provisions which merely 
require application of the Constitution. As such, even international human rights 
instruments have a status subordinate to the Constitution.
The requirement that interpretations should conform to international 
instruments, however, only applies to human rights provisions included in 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution.34 There are other provisions outside this Chapter 
that are directly or indirectly relevant to human rights. Chapter 10 that deals 
with the National Policy Principles and Objectives, for instance, contains 
essential provisions germane to human rights particularly to socio-economic and 
environmental rights.35 Even more directly relevant is the provision that deals 
with derogation of rights.36 Interpreting the derogation clause probably needs 
more guidance based on international and regional instruments and 
jurisprudence. However, since the provision dealing with the substantive and 
procedural requirements for derogation of rights in emergency exists outside 
Chapter 3, the interpretation of the derogation provision does not have to be in 
conformity with international standards.37 However, the interpretation provision 
should be understood purposively to oblige guidance and conformity in 
interpreting all provisions that have direct or indirect bearing on the 
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution.
The Constitution does not say anything about the relevance of foreign law 
and jurisprudence. However, Proclamation No. 251/2001 which was enacted to 
consolidate the House of Federation (HoF), i.e., the organ which has the power 
to interpret the Constitution, authorizes the HoF to identify, develop and
34 See Art. 13(2) of FDRE Constitution ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms specified 
in this Chapter’ (emphasis added/
35 See FDRE Constitution, Arts. 88-92 dealing with political, economic, social and 
environmental objectives, and principles of foreign policy.
36 See FDRE Constitution, Art 93.
37 There are however several rights which are non-derogable under international human 
rights law but are derogable under the Ethiopian Constitution - for instance, the right 
to life. For further discussion on derogation of rights, see item (f) below.
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implement principles of constitutional interpretation as it deems appropriate.38 
The legislation enacted to establish the Council of Constitutional Inquiry39 
reiterates the same authorization.40 This allows the HoF to look into foreign law 
and comparative jurisprudence in consolidating its own principles of 
interpretation.41 Yet, as Ethiopia is a civil law country highly influenced by civil 
law traditions, the instance of reference to foreign law and jurisprudence is 
likely to be rare.
Another relevant provision for purposes of interpretation is the presumption 
of the constitutionality of legislation.42 This implies that the onus of proving the 
unconstitutionality of any law or practice lies with the person or entity 
challenging the constitutionality of the action or omission. Finally, Article 106 
of the Constitution provides that the Amharic version is authoritative.
3. Protected Rights
The Ethiopian Constitution incorporates several human rights. The recognition 
ranges from traditional civil and political rights to socio-economic and group or 
solidarity rights. This is further reinforced by the National policy principles and 
objectives. The rights are generally guaranteed for everyone with some 
exceptions.43
38 Consolidation of the House of Federation and Definition of its Powers and 
Responsibilities Proclamation No. 251/2001, Art. 7(1).
39 The Council of Constitutional Inquiry is a constitutional body established to assist the 
House of Federation in interpreting the Constitution. It is composed of eleven 
members including the President and Vice President of the Federal Supreme Court, 
six other legal experts with proven competence and high moral standing appointed by 
the President of the Republic upon recommendation of the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives, and three others nominated by the House of Federation from among 
its members. See FDRE Constitution, Arts. 82-84.
40 Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No.250/2001 Art. 20 (1)
41 Indeed, the Council relied heavily on the US law and jurisprudence on issues of bail 
to reject a complaint that argued that the determination as to which crimes in relation 
to which bail might not be available, or available only to a limited extent may not be 
made by the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR) under the Ethiopian 
Constitution - see The case concerning the constitutionality of the law that excluded 
bail in corruption offences, Council of Constitutional Inquiry.
42 See Art. 9(1) of Consolidation of the House of the Federation and Definition of its 
Powers and Responsibilities Proclamation No. 251/2001.
43 Art. 33 (the right to nationality), Art. 38 (the right to vote and be voted for), Art 39 
(the right to self-determination), Art. 40 (the right to property), and Art. 
41 (economic, social and cultural rights), Art. 43 (the right to development to the 
totality of the peoples of Ethiopia, and to nationals) all establish rights only to
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3.1- Civil and political rights
The Constitution embodies several civil and political rights most of which are 
adopted from the provisions of the UDHR.44 The list includes the right to life 
(which forbids deprivation of life except as punishment for a serious offence 
determined by law),45 to security of the person, to liberty (which prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and deprivation of liberty), protection against cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment including the banning of slavery and 
trafficking in human beings for whatever reason, and forced or compulsory 
labor.46 The Constitution further guarantees the right to equality and equal 
protection of the law (Article 25); the right to privacy which may only be 
limited if “compelling circumstances” exist in accordance with law (Article 26). 
The freedom of religion, belief and opinion (Article 27); freedom of thought and 
expression including access to information of public interest;47 the right of 
assembly, demonstration and petition;48 the right to association for any cause or 
purpose (Article 31); freedom of movement including the right to reside 
anywhere within the national territory as well as the right to leave and return to 
Ethiopia (Article 32); the right to nationality, to change it at one’s will, and not 
to lose it for the mere reason of marriage to a foreign national are also 
recognized.49
Individuals and groups have the right to access to justice to obtain a decision 
or judgment over any justiciable matter in a court of law or other competent
Ethiopians. Hence, foreigners cannot as a right claim the benefits flowing from these 
rights.
44 In fact, the UDHR is the only human rights instrument that the Constitution expressly 
mentions. See art 13(2). The Constitution, though not by name, also refers to other 
instruments adopted by Ethiopia.
45 This obviously allows the imposition of the death penalty. It does not however define 
what a ‘serious crime’ means. It is apparently left to the discretion of the legislator to 
determine in relation to which crimes death sentence may be imposed. For instance, 
the new Anti-terrorism Proclamation No 652/2009 requires the imposition of the 
death penalty (see Art. 3).
46 See FDRE Constitution, Arts. 14 - 18.
47 FDRE Constitution, Art. 29. A new legislation to give effect to this provision has been 
enacted, see The Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation No 590/2008.
48 FDRE Constitution, Art. 30. A legislation has been enacted to give effect to this right, see 
Proclamation to Establish the Procedure for Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political 
Meeting No 3/1991
49 FDRE Constitution, Art. 33. An implementing legislation has been adopted. See the 
Ethiopian Nationality Proclamation No. 378/2003 for further detail. The constitutional 
provision does not however guarantee the right not to be forcefully expelled.
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body with judicial power.50 The right to vote and be elected is guaranteed to all 
Ethiopians of age (Article 38); similarly, the right to property is embodied under 
Article 40.
Moreover, the Constitution includes guarantees pertinent to the criminal 
justice system. The right of arrested persons51 to remain silent; to be promptly 
informed, in a language she/he understands, of the reasons for their arrest; to be 
brought before a judge in 48 hours, and habeaus corpus. It also excludes 
confession or admission obtained through coercion;52 and establishes the right to 
bail.53 Accused persons have the right to a public trial in an ordinary court 
within a reasonable time; to be informed with the particulars of the charge; the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence until 
proven guilty; access to and the right to challenge evidence presented against 
them and to adduce evidence on their behalf; the right to be represented by legal 
counsel of their choice; and if they cannot afford to pay for such counsel and if 
miscarriage of justice would result, to be provided with one at the expenses of 
the state54; and the right to appeal to a competent court.55
50 FDRE Constitution, Art. 37. The Constitution does not provide criteria for determining, 
nor a definition of, justiciability of a matter. it is therefore arguable whether, for instance, 
the policy principles of the Constitution are justiciable. Some suggest that what is 
justiciable is more or less well recognized. See Fasil Nahum “A Constitution for a Nation 
of Nations”, supra note 2 above, at 150. This, however, ignores the difference in domestic 
approaches on what constitutes justiciable disputes.
51 For the rights of accused persons, see FDRE Constitution, Article 20. Note that the 
difference between arrested and accused persons only relates to the pressing of 
charge. Once a charge is pressed, an arrested person becomes an accused person. 
Accused persons may however not always be arrested as they might exercise and be 
granted their right to bail.
52 Note that evidence obtained through other illegal methods, or involving procedural 
irregularities - such as failure to inform the arrested person of his right to remain 
silent, not involving coercion is not required to be discarded under the Constitution.
53 See FDRE Constitution, Art19. The constitutional provision on bail is not sufficiently 
clear on whether the law will prescribe the general standards, to be applied by the 
court in each case involving individual determination, or whether the law prescribes 
the specific cases as to when bail may be legitimately denied (for instance depending 
solely on the sentence of the crime with which the suspect is charged). The Criminal 
Procedure Code adopts standards. See the Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia 
Proclamation No 185/1961, Arts 63(1) and 67.
54 The phrase ‘miscarriage of justice’ has generally been determined based on the 
possible punishment the charge may entail.
55 This provision may be invoked to challenge the constitutionality of the Federal Courts 
Establishment Proclamation No 25/1996 (Art 8(1)) which gives the Federal Supreme 
Court first instance jurisdiction to try criminal cases involving high government
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Persons in custody have the right to treatment that respects their human 
dignity. They also have the right not to be held incommunicado and hence to be 
visited by their spouses or partners, close relatives, friends, religious councilors, 
medical doctors or their legal counsel.56 The retroactive application of criminal 
laws is also prohibited and hence unconstitutional.57 It is however controversial 
whether this guarantee applies to both substantive and procedural criminal laws 
alike.58 The Constitution prohibits double jeopardy in the form of re-trial or 
punishment for an offence upon which a final conviction or acquittal has been 
entered as per criminal law and procedure.59 This clearly means that double 
jeopardy does not apply to cases where there were irregularities in the 
application of the relevant criminal law or procedure.
Marital, personal and family rights with equal rights for both sexes while 
entering or during marriage, or at the time of divorce;60 the rights of women to
officials. Since the Supreme Court is the highest judicial body, there is no possibility 
of appeal from its orders or judgments. The only possible avenue is the Cassation 
Division of the Supreme Court which only considers questions of law, and not 
questions of fact which may be considered on appeal.
56 FDRE Constitution, Art. 21. This provision also means that arrested persons may not 
be (or at least do not have the right to be) visited by others who are not listed in the 
provision such as foreign diplomats or the media.
57 FDRE Constitution, Art. 22. This relates to criminal laws which either create a new 
crime, or impose more severe penalties for existing crimes. Exceptionally, retroactive 
application of criminal laws is permitted if it benefits the accused, for instance, by 
decriminalizing a previously criminal act or by reducing the penalty for such act.
58 Substantive criminal law refers to those laws that create new crimes, or aggravate the 
punishment for existing crimes; procedural criminal law relates to other criminal laws 
that do not create crimes but are detrimental to the accused such as those that 
retroactively exclude bail. In the first case, retroactivity is prohibited. But would a 
law that retroactively excludes bail be unconstitutional?
59 FDRE Constitution, Art. 23.
60 FDRE Constitution, Art. 34. The Constitution, however, allows for the establishment 
of religious or customary courts such as Sharia Courts (FDRE Constitution, Art. 
34(5) and 78(5)). This authorizes the adjudication of disputes of a family and 
personal nature in accordance of religious or customary laws, with the consent of the 
parties. Obviously the application of Islamic law, for instance, might lead to unequal 
treatment between men and women in marriage or during divorce. This obviously 
contradicts the equality guarantee under Arts. 25 and 34(1), and Article 35(7) which 
guarantees equal treatment in the inheritance of property. The House of Federation 
had missed a golden opportunity to rule whether decisions of customary and religious 
courts are appealable to regular courts when it rejected an appropriate case for want 
of standing - The case was submitted to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry by the 
Islamic Affairs Supreme Council in Tikimit 1992 (October 1999) and decided by the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry on 25 January 2000.
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equality, protection from harmful customary and religious practices, right to 
maternity leave, right to acquire property, equal employment opportunities, and 
access to family planning education and information are also protected. This is 
further supplemented by the right to affirmative action.61 The rights of children 
to name and nationality, and to be free from corporal punishment or cruel and 
inhuman treatment in schools and other institutions responsible for the care of 
children is also stipulated; the best interest of the child is the primary guiding 
principle; juvenile offenders must be detained separately from adults;62 children 
born in and out of wedlock enjoy equal rights.63
3.2- Economic, social and cultural rights (ESC Rights)
The Ethiopian Constitution incorporates various EsC rights. Every Ethiopian 
has the right to freely engage in economic activities; to choose his/her means of 
livelihood, occupation and profession; and equal access to publicly funded 
services. it further requires the state to allocate ever-increasing resources to 
provide social services; provide funds for the rehabilitation of persons with 
disabilities, the aged and children without parents or guardian subject to
61 FDRE Constitution, Art. 35. The Constitution (Article 7) moreover declares that 
provisions set out in the masculine gender also apply to the feminine gender. There is 
no similar counter right to family planning education and information to men. 
Regarding affirmative action, the Constitution does not make it clear whether and 
when it may stop.
62 Note however that there is only one Juvenile Rehabilitation Centre situated in Addis 
Abeba. Hence, juveniles are in practice detained with adults in other parts of the 
country.
63 FDRE Constitution, Art 36. The Constitution does not ban corporal punishment in a 
family setup. Moreover, even the principle of the best interest of the child does not 
expressly refer to decisions taken by the family - it only binds ‘public and private 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies’. 
This interpretation is supported by the Federal Revised Family Code Proclamation 
No 213/2000 which authorizes courts to intervene in decisions of the parents 
concerning children only when the parents fail to privately settle the disagreement 
(Art. 266(2)). However, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has 
ruled that the provisions of the Federal Revised Family Code may only be applied to 
the extent in compliance with the best interest of the child - see Miss Tsedale 
Demissie v Mr Kifle Demissie, Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, File 
23632, Judgment 6 November 2007. The principle of detention as a last resort and to 
the minimum possible regarding child offenders is also not guaranteed (compare Art 
37(b) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Rule 5 of the Beijing Rules, 
U.N.Doc.A/40/53/1985). We should therefore employ the interpretation provision 
(FDRE Constitution, Article 13(2)) to refer to international and regional human rights 
instruments to fill these yawning gaps in the Constitution.
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available means;64 and to pursue policies aimed at expanding job opportunities 
for the poor through undertaking programmes and public works projects. It also 
imposes a duty on the state to protect and preserve historic and cultural legacies, 
and to contribute to the promotion of arts and sports.
The Constitution also guarantees several labour rights. These rights include 
the right to association including the right to form trade unions for collective 
bargaining purposes; the right to strike; equal pay for equal work; paid leaves; 
reasonable limits to working hours; and a healthy and safe work environment.65
The ESC rights under the Ethiopian Constitution have some variation from 
the UDHR and iCESCR. One major difference from most civil and political 
rights in the Constitution is that ESC rights are guaranteed only for the benefit 
of Ethiopians.66 Moreover, the provisions create government obligations, rather 
than individual or collective rights, in a manner similar to the state policy 
principles and objectives. The general and duty-based formulation makes it 
difficult to determine whether these rights are justiciable.67 Since the 
Constitution does not indicate their non-justiciability, it can be argued that these 
rights are in fact justiciable, at least in the House of Federation.68 Justiciability 
will also depend on the level of activism exercised by the members of the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the House of Federation itself. In any 
case, the socio-economic rights provisions of the Constitution should be
64 Note that ever increasing resources does not mean maximum available resources.
65 FDRE Constitution, Art. 42. Note that the Constitution does not recognize the right of 
employers or employers’ associations to lockout. However, the Labour Proclamation 
No 377/ 2003 Art. 157(2) recognizes the right to lock out. This arguably raises 
questions of constitutionality. In any case, however, the Constitution places the right 
to lock out at an inferior position to the right to strike as the procedure of amendment 
of ordinary legislation is loose compared to the procedure of amending the 
Constitution.
66 See FDRE Constitution, Art. 41. This is in line with Article 4 of the ICESCR which 
allows developing states to determine the extent to which the rights will benefit non­
nationals.
67 For instance, Article 41(4) provides: “The state shall have the obligation to allocate 
ever increasing resources to provide to the public health, and other services”. This 
does not establish a right to health or education as such.
68 In fact, since the House of Federation is itself a political body, the legitimacy question 
may not arise. Moreover, it seems that the justiciability argument is gradually 
declining (at least internationally) especially with the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR (adopted by the UN General Assembly on10 December 
2008) which recognizes complaint procedures for the rights enshrined in the 
ICESCR. This at least has a persuasive value in understanding the justiciability of 
socio-economic rights.
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formulated in a way that establishes individual justiciable rights. In this regard, 
the Constitution should follow the formulation employed in the ICESCR or the 
UDHR, in a way that creates rights than establish abstract obligations on the 
government.
The Constitution also guarantees several socio-economic rights as part of the 
National Policy Principles and Objectives.69 However, it does not expressly 
declare the non-justiciability of the provisions of the National policy principles 
and Objectives.70 Hence, the House of Federation or other institutions may 
either directly apply the principles as binding undertakings, or at least use them 
to guide the interpretation and understanding of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms.71
3.3- Group or solidarity rights
One essential feature of the Ethiopian Constitution is the recognition of what are 
called third generation or group or solidarity rights. The right to self­
determination up to secession, the right to development and the right to a clean 
and healthy environment are clearly enshrined.72
The right to development is recognized as a benefit of the peoples of Ethiopia 
as a whole, and in the form of a right to participation. The right to clean and 
healthy environment similarly recognizes the right for the benefit of all persons; 
as such it appears more like a guarantee which accrues to each individual. The
69 See FDRE Constitution, Arts. 89-91. These provisions are generally similar in 
formulation with Art. 41 (the ESC rights provision), except that they are more 
elaborate.
70 The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, Section 6(6)(c) and the 1950 Indian Constitution, 
Section 37 unequivocally declare the non-justiciabillity of the provisions in the 
respective constitutions dealing with state policy principles and guidelines.
71 In India, for instance, the Supreme Court has read the Directive Principles of State 
Policy (DPSP) into the justiciable guarantees of the Constitution despite an explicit 
declaration of non-justiciability. At the same time, the DPSP are employed to insulate 
certain measures from attack based on violation of certain justiciable rights; see for 
instance the case of State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas (1976) 2 (SCC) 310 - where it 
was held that the fundamental rights and DPSP are complementary, ‘neither part 
being superior to the other’. In Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 
SCC 225 it was held that ‘In building up a just social order it is sometimes imperative 
that the fundamental rights should be subordinated to directive principles’. See 
generally ‘Justiciability of ESC Rights: The Indian experience’ Circle of Rights - 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Activism available at:
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/justiciability.htm> (accessed 
28 July 2010).
72 See FDRE Constitution, Arts. 39, 43 and 44.
56 Mizan Law Review Vol. 5 No.1, Spring 2011
Constitution also recognizes the right to monetary or alternative means of 
compensation for individuals when state programmes entail displacement or 
adversely affect their livelihood.73
The right of “nations, nationalities and peoples” to self-determination, up to 
secession74 includes the right to speak, write, develop their language; to express, 
promote and develop their culture; preserve their history; and to self­
government and equitable representation in the regional state and federal 
governments. The preconditions for secession are listed under Article 39: a two- 
thirds majority support of the Legislative Council of the nation, nationality and 
people concerned; a simple majority vote in a referendum to be organized in a 
maximum of three years from the time the demand has been espoused by the 
relevant Legislative Council, and when transfer of power and division of assets 
has been effected. All this process is conducted under the auspices of the House 
of Federation.75
in conclusion, the Ethiopian Constitution embodies a progressive list of 
rights compared to its predecessors.76 The special features of the Constitution 
include the recognition given to the ethnic diversity and the willingness to 
accommodate it through the right to self-determination. However, the provisions 
concerning ESC rights are insufficient and there is a need to re-formulate them 
in tune with the iCESCR and other relevant instruments ratified by Ethiopia.
3.4- The distinction between ‘human rights’ and ‘democratic 
rights’
The Ethiopian Constitution unduly classifies the provisions on fundamental 
rights and freedoms into human rights (Articles 14-28), and democratic rights
73 The right to compensation only relates to state programmes. The protection does not 
accrue if the displacement or the adverse effect is a result of non-state programmes.
74 This, it should be noted, is a natural extension of the sovereignty conferred on 
nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution Art. 8(1)).
FDRE Constitution, Art. 39(5) defines a "Nation, Nationality or People" as ”a 
group of people who have or share a large measure of common culture or similar 
customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a 
common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly 
contiguous territory”.
75 Art. 62(3) of the FDRE Constitution, and Proclamation to Consolidate the House of 
Federation No 251/2001 Art19.
76 See, however, the discussion on the limitation and derogation of rights below. The 
extensive nature of permissible limitations and the list of derogable rights has 
significantly reduced the level of protection.
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(Articles 29-44). 77 Article 10 of the Constitution creates the impression that 
human rights are those that emanate from the nature of mankind, and democratic 
rights as those inherent in democracies.78 The preparatory work of the 
Constitution moreover suggests that human rights are those rights that a person 
is entitled merely because he or she is a human being, and democratic rights are 
those conferred only on citizens.79 This was, for instance, how the Minster of 
Justice argued during a preliminary debate on the draft bill of the Ethiopian 
Civil Society Law.80 The Constitution clearly limits the application of a right to 
Ethiopians whenever it deems it necessary regarding each right.81 Moreover, 
limiting the application of rights to citizens will be inconsistent with 
international human rights instruments adopted by Ethiopia. The ICCPR for 
instance applies to all persons within the territory or jurisdiction of ratifying 
states.82 Hence, no substantive distinction should be made merely on the ground 
of whether a right appears under the ‘human rights’ or ‘democratic rights’ 
section.
77 For a deeper analysis of the reasons and arguments regarding this classification, see 
Gedion Timothewos (2010), ‘Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia: The Jurisprudential 
Dearth’, 4(2) Mizan Law Review 207-213 arguing that the classification is ‘without 
significant impact’ and that any other interpretation of the classification will be 
‘absurd’. Any difference, if any, seems to be in the underlying reasons for 
incorporating the different category of rights rather than their practical implications 
i.e. human rights are recognized because they are imbued in humanity and human 
nature, and democratic rights are recognized because they are expressions of 
desirable democratic principles and governance. we should not attach practical 
significance to the classification especially when to do so runs against clear 
constitutional provisions.
78 some commentators criticize this as artificial and confusing as what are traditionally 
called human rights are also found in the part dealing with democratic rights. see sA 
Yeshaneh, “The Justiciability of Human Rights”, supra note 30 above, at 275 &276.
79 See Minutes of the Discussion on the Draft Constitution at the Council of 
Representatives, May 1994. See also T. Regassa “Making legal sense of human 
rights”, supra note 3 above, at 303.
80 Ethiopian Television, 5 January 2009. The Minster mentioned this in justifying the 
exclusion of foreign NGOs and domestic NGOs receiving more than 10% of their 
budget from a foreign source from engaging on issues touching upon, even 
tangentially, human rights and good governance.
81 Thus the right to vote and be elected, ESC Rights, right to nationality, right to 
property, and the right to development are clearly granted to Ethiopians. Freedom of 
expression and the right to association are, however, granted to the benefit of 
everyone though they are placed in the part dealing with democratic rights.
82 Art 2(1) ICCPR.
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4. Limitation of Rights under the Ethiopian Constitution
Most human rights are not absolute. There may therefore be certain limits to the 
exercise of rights. Limitations refer to infringements or encroachments on 
guaranteed rights under narrowly contoured permissible circumstances.83 There 
are different approaches to limitation of rights in constitutions: some 
constitutions and international instruments include internal individualized 
limitation clauses within each particular right in different details;84 others have 
adopted general limitation clauses whose application cuts across all provisions.85 
Still others adopt a combined approach because in addition to a general 
limitation clause they may include their own internal limitations.
The Ethiopian Constitution only contains claw-back clauses within most of 
the protected rights. Some of the internal limitations simply refer to those 
limitations determined or established by law;86 while others are more detailed 
and require compelling circumstances and specific laws necessary to safeguard 
public security, peace, the prevention of crimes, public morality, and the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.87 There are therefore different 
standards depending on which right the Constitution seeks to limit. The problem 
is exacerbated by the absence of a more sweeping general limitation clause in 
the Constitution that would have ensured uniformity of standards in scrutinizing 
the conformity of limitations of rights with the basic tenets of the Constitution.
The absence of a general limitations clause may have advantages as it leaves 
some rights, which do not have internal limitations, beyond limitations. For 
instance, the protection against torture and inhuman treatment or punishment in 
the Ethiopian Constitution may not in any way be limited. This will not 
generally be the case in a constitution that has opted for a general limitation 
clause. For instance, the South African Constitution allows the limitation of “the 
rights in the Bill of Rights” so long as it stands the constitutional test of
83 They generally require legality, necessity, rational connection between the limitation 
and its stated purpose, and proportionality.
84 For instance, the ICCPR, the Ethiopian Constitution, and the Constitution of the USA. 
The African Charter also does not have a general limitation clause although the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has used article 27(2) as a 
general limitation clause - see for instance Media Rights Agenda and Others v 
Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998) Para 68.
85 See for instance, the UDHR Art. 29(2), and the Constitution of the Republic of South 
African, section 36(1).
86 For instance, the right to life, liberty, bail, (FDRE Constitution Arts. 15, 17 and 19 
respectively).
87 The rights to privacy, freedom of religion, belief and opinion, freedom of expression 
and assembly and association (FDRE Constitution, Arts. 26, 27,29, 30, 31).
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reasonability and justifiability.88 Hence, in the absence of a general limitation 
clause, it is possible to have a right that may not be limited in any way, if there 
is no internal limitation to that effect. However, lack of a general limitation 
clause can have its downsides, as it might invite arbitrary, limitless limitations. 
some in fact describe the general limitation clause as the most important clause 
in a bill of rights.89 If there is a general limitation clause, however, every right is 
potentially limitable and rights with internal limitation will be subjected to 
double limitation analysis.90
several problems can be identified concerning the possible limitation of 
rights in the Ethiopian Constitution. First, there is no requirement in some 
cases, such as the right to life and liberty, that the limitation be rationally 
connected to the purpose it aspires to achieve, and be necessary and proportional 
so long as the limitation is based on law. 91 The provisions only adopt the 
legality requirement implying the acceptability of limitations so long as such 
limitations are established or determined by law without any inquiry into the 
fairness and propriety of the law. The minimum threshold for restraining 
fundamental rights and freedoms is significantly low. For instance, it is not 
clear whether a law that imposes capital punishment on children will stand the
88 See section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The Constitutional 
Court of South Africa has for instance held that even the rights of children are subject 
to the limitation analysis - see the case of S vM2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) Para 18.
89 Stuart Woolman (1994), “Riding the push-me pull-you: Constructing a test that 
reconciles the conflicting interests which animate the limitation clause”, 10 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 60, at 60.
90 For instance, most of the socio-economic guarantees in the South African 
Constitution are internally limited to the availability of resources. They are moreover 
subject to possible limitation under Section 36 of the same Constitution - See for 
instance Sections 26(right to housing) and 27 (the right to health and social security).
91 For the principles that should guide limitation and derogation of rights, see the 
Siracusa (1985), “Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, UN Economic and Social 
Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4. According to these principles, limitation 
of rights must be based on (1) law, (2) have a legitimate aim, and (3) be necessary.
The Indian Supreme Court during its initial stages accepted all limitations so long 
as established by law without any inquiry into its fairness. It for instance allowed 
preventive detention so long as provided by law - A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 
AIR 1950 SC 27. This understanding was later rightly reversed in favour of the 
requirements of guarantees of non-arbitrariness, reasonableness and fairness implicit 
in the provisions that protect human rights in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 
1978 SC 597.
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test of constitutionality.92 Apparently, so long as the limitation emanates from a 
law, whatever its purpose, it is a permissible limitation. There is moreover no 
definition as to what ‘law’ means: does it include parliamentary statutes only? 
Or does it also include regulations, directives or even rules and practices of 
administrative agencies? Should it moreover be a law of general application, 
clear, precise and accessible allowing predictability?93
These are pertinent questions that need to be answered before limitations on 
the protected rights. In determining the justifiability of limitations, reference 
should be made to international and regional instruments and the jurisprudence 
of established treaty forums. The UDHR, for instance, includes a general 
limitation clause under Article 29. This should guide the determination of the 
justifiability of limitations on those rights that have internal limitations. It 
should, however, not be used to justify the limitation of rights whose limitation 
has not been anticipated by the Constitution i.e. provisions which do not 
incorporate internal limitations.
5. Derogation in Cases of Emergencies
The Ethiopian Constitution recognizes possibilities that may require the 
suspension of protected rights.94 Derogation clauses relate to provisions that
92 There is a provision in the Ethiopian Criminal Code (Proclamation No 414/2004) 
which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on persons under the age of 
eighteens at the time of the commission of the crime (Art 117(1)). But this is only a 
guarantee by an ordinary legislation which may be reversed through an amendment 
or modification in an ordinary procedure. It is to be noted that new anti-terrorism 
proclamation, for example, imposes death penalty and does not embody an express 
exception to infants and young offenders. Yet, Articles 52 to 56 of the 2004 Criminal 
Code and other provisions such as Art. 117(1) of the same Code are applicable as the 
General Part of the Criminal Code applies to all special criminal legislation by virtue 
of Art. 3 of the Criminal Code. See also Article 36 of the Constitution which 
guarantees the right to life of the child.
93 See for instance the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Klass & Others 
c. Allemagne v. Germany (1979) 2 EHRR 214, which defined law broadly, and 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, where it was held that the law 
must be clear and accessible with foreseeable consequences.
94 FDRE Constitution, Art. 93. Derogations are different form limitations in that they 
are often temporary and may suspend a right wholly. Limitations on the other hand 
may be permanent and are meant to perpetually balance the public interest with the 
rights of individuals and groups; unlike derogations, limitations cannot negate the 
essential element of a right. Moreover, there is no need for emergencies to justify 
limitation of rights; but emergencies or crises are condition precedents for the 
legitimate derogation from or suspension of rights.
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permit the temporary suspension of the application and enjoyment of rights in 
response to incidences of emergency that threaten the life of a nation.95 
Derogations do not, however, confer absolute discretion on the executive to act 
on its whims; there are substantive as well as procedural requirements that 
govern such emergency situations.96 There are, moreover, certain rights, which 
may not be suspended even in threatening situations. These preconditions are 
designed as a protection against possible abuses of human rights on the pretext 
of emergencies while at the same time authorizing states to secure, maintain and 
ensure the sustenance of fundamental national and international interests.
Article 93 of the Constitution prescribes the requirements, both procedural 
and substantive. The only conditions that may justify derogations are occurrence 
of an external invasion, a breakdown of law and order which cannot be 
controlled by the regular law enforcement agencies and personnel, or the 
occurrence of a natural disaster or an epidemic.
The Council of Ministers of the federal Ethiopian government has the power 
to declare state of emergency under any of the above situations. The Regional 
states are also allowed to declare state of emergency to avert natural disaster or 
epidemic within their respective territories. The ultimate power to approve or 
annul a declaration of emergency made by the Council of Ministers, however, 
lies with the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR). This decision is 
required to be made within 48 hours if the HoPR is in session, or within 15 days
95 See the Siracusa Principles and the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights 
Norms (International Law Association, 1985); RB Lillich (1985), “The Paris 
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a state of emergency”, 79 American 
Journal of International Law 1072, at 1075.
96 F.N. Aolain (1995), “The emergence of diversity: Differences in human rights 
jurisprudence” 19 Fordham International Law Journal 101, at 101.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not contain any 
derogation clause. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has 
interpreted this omission as prohibition of derogation from the Charter provisions. 
See for instance, the case of Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des 
Libertes v Chad (2000) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995) Para 21; Media Rights Agenda 
and Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200(ACHPR 1998) Para 67 - implying that all 
the rights in the African Charter are essentially non-derogable. Some however argue 
that this should not be the case - see F Ouguergouz (2003), The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human dignity and 
sustainable democracy in Africa (Brill Academic Publishers); C Heyns “Civil and 
Political Rights in the African Charter” in M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights the system in practice 1986-2000 (2002, 
Cambridge University Press) at 139.
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if the HoPR is not in session at the time of the declaration of emergency.97 Upon 
approval by a two-third majority vote, the state of emergency may remain up to 
six months subject to its renewal for up to four months on each occasion through 
the same procedure.98 If annulled, the declaration will be repealed forthwith.99
The Constitution authorizes the possible suspension of most of the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms to “the extent necessary” with handful 
exceptions.100 The only non-derogable rights are the prohibition against cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, and slavery or servitude, and 
trafficking (Article 18), the right to equality and equal protection of the law 
(Article 25), and the right to self-determination up to secession (Article 39).101
The Constitution requires the HoPR to establish, simultaneously with the 
approval of the state of emergency, an ad hoc State of Emergency inquiry Board 
consisting of seven members chosen and assigned by the House from among its 
members and from legal experts.102 This body, among others, monitors and 
follows up the situation to ensure that no measure taken during the state of
97 It should be noted that the HoPR only has the final say over federal declarations of 
emergency by the Council of Ministers. States have their own constitutional 
provisions governing emergency declarations and there is no need for approval by the 
HoPR.
98 The review power of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR) is in line with 
the Paris Minimum Principles which require judicial or other review mechanisms. 
Note that the Constitution does not set a maximum period for the state of emergency; 
it may therefore last indefinitely so long as it gets approved by the HoPR.
99 This implies that the annulment has only prospective effect. This is particularly 
worrisome in cases where the HoPR is not in session, but annuls the declaration of 
emergency later, as damage may already have been done within the 15 days. Hence, 
the procedure might leave victims without remedy.
100 This is a significant internal limitation that exacts necessity and proportionality 
which relates to the severity, duration and scope (geographical) of the application of 
the emergency declaration. For more discussion on requirements of necessity and 
proportionality see Aly Mokhtar (2004) ‘Human rights obligations vs Derogations: 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 8(1) International Journal 
of Human Rights 68; see also the case of Lawless v. Ireland (Merits) § 28, European 
Court of Human Rights, 1961, Ser. A.
101 The other provision which is non-derogable is the Federal and Democratic structure 
of the state. See FDRE Constitution, Article 93(4) (b &c). The constitutional list of 
non-derogable rights clearly differs with the list of non-derogable rights in the ICCPR 
(Article 4) - the right to life and the prohibition of retroactive application of criminal 
law are for instance missing in the constitutional list.
102 See FDRE Constitution, Art 93(5). The proportion between the number of members 
of the House and legal experts is left to the discretion of the HoPR - there is no 
minimum requirement.
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emergency is inhuman and ensures the “prosecution of perpetrators of inhuman 
acts”.
It is worth noting that the Constitution does not provide for the duty of the 
Council of Ministers or the HoPR to publish the State of Emergency declaration 
and ensure its accessibility. Moreover, it does not reaffirm the duty of the state 
to inform, inter alia, member states to the ICCPR.103
6. Amending the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Provisions
Amendment is a mechanism by which constitutions adapt to changing 
circumstances through “perfecting imperfections”.104 Constitutional amendment 
procedures should set the balance between the inherent need to adapt and ensure 
stability, and the necessity to bar regressive gold-digging alterations.
The Ethiopian Constitution adopts two distinct procedures of amendment: 
one relating to the fundamental rights and freedoms provisions, and another for 
the rest of the Constitution.105 The procedure for amending the bill of rights is 
more stringent.106 This is a further manifestation of the commitment of the 
Constitution’s preamble to fully respect and protect fundamental rights and 
freedoms as a pillar and precondition of an ordered and democratic society.
As a federal state, the Constitution represents, protects and preserves the 
mutual interest of the federal government as well as the regional states. Any 
amendment procedure should, therefore, accommodate the interest of both 
entities. Amendments to the human rights provisions of the Constitution may 
only be approved when all the Regional State Councils approve the proposed 
amendment; and when the HoPR and the House of Federation, in separate 
sessions, approve the proposed amendment by a two-third majority vote. Other 
provisions of the Constitution may be amended if: the HoPR and the House of
103 Art 4 of the ICCPR requires states to inform other member states when declaring 
emergencies.
104 See J Hatchard (1998) “Perfecting imperfections’: Developing procedures for 
amending constitutions in commonwealth Africa” 36(3) The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 381.
105 FDRE Constitution, Art. 105. Note that these procedures are different from the way 
ordinary legislation is adopted and amended which is by a simple majority vote in 
the HPR. The State Councils are not in any way involved in the adoption and 
amendment of federal (ordinary) laws.
106 Note however that under the current political realities, these procedural safeguards 
are irrelevant as the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) currently controls more than 99% of the federal parliamentary seats. There 
has been a similar trend of dominance since the first Ethiopian multi party elections 
in May 1995.
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Federation in a joint session approve the amendment by a two-third majority 
vote, and when two-third of the State Councils approves the proposed 
amendment by majority vote.
Apparently, the de jure procedure of amending the human rights provisions 
of the Constitution is stringent enough to discourage retrogressive amendments. 
it is, however, at the same time so rigorous as to exclude any upgrading of the 
constitutional protection of rights. Hence, constitutionalization of new rights107 
as well as amendments to raise the level of protection of recognized rights108 
would have to pass through the same exclusionary procedure intended to 
preclude retrogressive amendments. Hence, the Constitution could have adopted 
two separate amendment provisions apropos its human rights provisions 
depending on the consequences of the amendment on the level of protection of 
the fundamental human rights and freedoms. Less stringent procedures for 
progressive amendments that aim at increasing the list of rights or the scope of 
guaranteed rights could have been preferable.109
Moreover, the Constitution does not anticipate the possibility of holding a 
referendum to amend the Constitution. This is the case even when there is a 
stalemate between the major actors. For instance, the HoPR, or the House of 
Federation, or the State Councils, or even the Council of Ministers may support 
an amendment, yet one of the others may be against it. in such cases, direct vote 
of the public on the amendment should have been called for.110 However, there 
is no procedure that requires the participation of the public at large in approving 
certain sensitive amendment proposals.111 Moreover, there is no room in the 
amendment procedure for representatives of civil society and other relevant 
actors. The Constitution does not also anticipate provisions that may not be 
amended under any circumstances. Most importantly, since the more stringent 
procedure applies to amending those provisions in Chapter 3, other provisions
107 For instance, there is no right to remedy for violations of human rights in the 
Constitution. There is also no prohibition of arrest for failure to pay a civil debt. 
Moreover, all the socio-economic rights are not really couched as rights, rather as 
goals.
108 For instance, to amend the right to life provision to abolish the death penalty.
109 The author is aware that such a provision may be abused. However, whenever there 
are differences on the possible consequences of a proposed amendment, the dispute 
may be subject to judicial resolution, or to resolution by the House of Federation as 
it is the organ responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution.
110 For instance, in the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Benin, referendum is 
necessary when a proposal fails to secure 4/5th of the votes of the National 
Assembly. See Arts. 154-56.
111 For more on the merits and demerits of holding referendum to amend Constitutions 
see Hatchard ‘’Perfecting imperfections”, supra note 104 above.
Human Rights in the Ethiopian Constitution: A Descriptive Overview 65
relevant to human rights but that are found outside this Chapter, such as the 
provision dealing with derogation in emergency situations, may be amended 
through the ordinary procedure.
7. Adjudication of Constitutional Disputes
All judicial power rests with an independent judiciary and courts which are 
subject only to the law.112 The Ethiopian Constitution establishes two parallel 
judicial structures: one at the Federal level, which hierarchically consists of the 
First Instance Court, High Court and the Federal Supreme Court, and one at the 
State (Regional) level consisting of First Instance (Woreda) Courts, High 
(Zonal) Courts, and Regional Supreme Courts.113
However, as mentioned earlier, the power of interpreting the Constitution lies 
with the House of Federation consisting of representatives of nations, 
nationalities and peoples.114 Apparently, the Constitution either does not 
consider the role of the judiciary in the adjudication of constitutional disputes, 
or it has made an exception to the judicial power of courts. With regard to the 
legal expertise required in constitutional interpretation, the Constitution 
establishes the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, mainly composed of legal 
experts, to assist the House of Federation in determining whether there is need 
for constitutional interpretation, and if so, to provide recommendations to the 
HoF for a final decision.115
112 FDRE Constitution, Arts. 78 and 79.
113 Note also that the Constitution authorizes the adjudication of personal and family 
disputes in accordance with customary and religious laws upon the consent of both 
parties (Article 34(5)). Consequently, Sharia Courts have been established all over 
the country.
114 See FDRE Constitution, Art. 62(1). This is atypical of most other systems where 
such power is often vested in either ordinary courts or a special court established 
solely for such purpose. For a discussion on whether this approach represents a 
response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma and the legitimacy of the approach - 
see YT Fisseha (2004) “Who interprets the Constitution: A descriptive and 
normative discourse on the Ethiopian approach to constitutional review” LLM 
Dissertation (Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria). For a discussion of the most 
common type of institutions engaged in judicial review of constitutions in most 
countries, see WK Geck ‘Judicial review of statutes: A comparative survey of 
present institutions and practices’ (1965-1966) 51 Cornell Law Quarterly 250
115 FDRE Constitution, Arts. 62(2), and 82 - 84. The Council has 11 members 
consisting of both legal experts and politicians: the President and Vice President of 
the Federal Supreme Court, six legal experts appointed by the President of the 
Republic upon recommendation by the House of Peoples’ Representatives, and three 
persons appointed by the House of Federation from among its members.
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The Constitution requires that ‘all constitutional disputes’ shall be decided 
by the HoF.116 The jurisdiction of the HoF extends to contentions over the 
constitutionality of Federal or State laws.117 Despite the clear constitutional 
provision empowering the HoF and the Council of Constitutional Inquiry to 
preside over constitutional issues, there has been an academic debate on whether 
there is anything left for courts to interpret the Constitution.
A. Fiseha argues that it is only the constitutionality of legislative enactments 
that is exclusively reserved to the House of Federation and the Council as 
implied in Art. 84(2) which only refers to ‘any federal or state law’.118 The 
Amharic version particularly makes it even clearer as it refers to laws made by 
legislative organs. Similarly, Donovan argues that the drafters of the 
Constitution only had the intention to take away from the ordinary courts the 
power to invalidate statutes as unconstitutional.119 He reinforces his arguments 
with the constitutional duty of courts to enforce the Constitution as every small 
measure of enforcement unavoidably involves some kind of interpretation.120 I. 
idris moreover notes that ‘any petition on the unconstitutionality of an 
administrative act or a decision or custom is within the judicial jurisdiction of an 
ordinary court’.121 In short, they argue that the Courts have the residual power to 
consider constitutionality of cases that, for instance, involve violation of rights 
by the executive.122 T. Regassa moreover states that judicial review is a normal
116 Article 83(1).
117 See FDRE Constitution, Art. 84(2).
118 See A. Fiseha (2001), ‘Constitutional Interpretation: The Respective Role of the 
Courts and the House of Federation’, in Proceedings of the Symposium on the Role 
of Courts in the Enforcement of the Constitution (Addis Ababa) pp. 6-26; A Fiseha 
(2005) ‘Federalism and the Adjudication of Constitutional Issues: The Ethiopian 
Experience’, Netherlands International Law Review 1; see also I Ibrahim (2002), 
‘Constitutional adjudication under the 1994 FDRE Constitution’ 1(1) Ethiopian Law 
Review 62; T. Regassa (2000) ‘Courts and the human rights norms in Ethiopia’ in A. 
Fiseha (eds) Proceedings of the symposium on the role of the courts in the 
enforcement of the Constitution, (Ethiopian Civil Service College).
119 DA Donovan (2002) ‘Leveling the Playing field: the Judicial duty to protect and 
enforce the constitutional rights of accused persons unrepresented by counsel’, 1 
Ethiopian Law Review 31.
120 Articles 9(2) and 13(1) FDRE Constitution.
121 I. Idris (2002), ‘Constitutional adjudication under the 1994 FDRE (Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) Constitution’ 1Ethiopian Law Review 63 71
122 A. Fiseha (2005), ‘Federalism and the Adjudication of Constitutional Issues: The 
Ethiopian Experience’ Netherlands International Law Review 1, 21
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inherent business of courts as is implied, in the Ethiopian case, in the vesting of 
all judicial power in the courts.123
‘Law’ has been defined very broadly to include proclamations issued by the 
Federal or state legislative organs, and regulations and directives issued by the 
Federal and States government institutions and also international agreements.124 
Some scholars consider this expansive interpretation as a ‘blunder’ and 
unconstitutional encroachment upon the implied residual jurisdiction of ordinary 
courts under the Constitution to consider the constitutionality, for instance, of 
directives, regulations, executive action as well as international agreements.125
The scholars who argue that Ethiopian courts have the power to look into the 
constitutionality of all acts and omissions except that of legislative statutes seem 
to rely exclusively on Article 84(2) which appears to only refer to legislative 
enactments ignoring Article 83(1) which simply says ‘all constitutional 
disputes’ shall be decided by the House of Federation. All constitutional 
disputes necessarily include any constitutional issue, whether or not it involves 
interpretation or application of the Constitution. Besides, it is Article 83 that 
determines the substantive issue on which organ has the power to interpret the 
Constitution. Article 84 only outlines the power relationships between the 
Council and the House of Federation and the procedure that should be followed 
to address constitutional issues.
The argument that courts have a residual power to adjudicate over 
constitutional issues not involving the constitutionality of legislative acts seems
123 Article 79(1). See T. Regassa, “Courts and the Human Rights Norms in Ethiopia” in 
F A. Fiseha (ed) Proceedings of the symposium on the role of the courts in the 
enforcement of the Constitution (2000) 116. The argument which should be noted is 
what led the US Supreme Court to assume the power of judicial review in Marbury v 
Madison although the US Constitution did not explicitly grant such power.
124 Art 2(2) of Proclamation No 251/2001. Note that there is a difference in the 
definition of the scope of ‘law’ in this Proclamation and the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No 250/2001 which does not include directives 
of State or Federal institutions (see art 2(5) of Proclamation No 250/2001).
125 See for instance A Fiseha (2005), ‘Federalism and the Adjudication of Constitutional 
Issues: The Ethiopian Experience’ Netherlands International Law Review 1, 20; see 
also I Ibrahim (2002),‘Constitutional adjudication under the 1994 FDRE 
Constitution’ 1(1) Ethiopian Law Review 62; R Tsegaye (2000) ‘Courts and the 
human rights norms in Ethiopia’ in A Fiseha (ed) Proceedings of the symposium on 
the role of the courts in the enforcement of the Constitution, Ethiopian Civil Service 
College); A Fiseha (2000) ‘Constitutional interpretation: The respective role of 
courts and the House of Federation’ in A Fiseha (ed) Proceedings of the symposium 
on the role of the courts in the enforcement of the Constitution (Ethiopian Civil 
Service College);
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to be based on a selective reading of the provisions of the Constitution.126 Even 
if we assume that there is actually a residual power, Fisseha convincingly argues 
that judicial review for constitutionality may not be understood as an inherently 
judicial power particularly in Ethiopia where historically ‘declaring a law void 
for its repugnancy to the constitution has never been considered as the normal 
business of the courts’.127 M. Haile also observed that the absence of a clear 
provision granting residual power to courts only creates a lacuna and does not 
necessarily imply that courts will arrogate that residual power, if any, to 
themselves.128
In Ethiopia, the power to pass final decision over all constitutional disputes 
lies with the House of Federation and the role of courts is utterly limited to 
referring cases to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry wherever a case may not 
be resolved without first determining the constitutionality of the law based on 
which it is to be decided.129 There should not be confusion between what ought 
to be (i.e., courts should have some power in interpreting the Constitution) vis­
a-vis what is the law as it currently exists (i.e., the power of constitutional 
review lies with the HoF and Council of Constitutional Inquiry). Since the 
House of Federation is a political organ, and judicial review inherently requires 
the involvement of the judiciary, it is hard to say that there exists judicial review 
in Ethiopia.130 This is true to legislative acts, administrative acts or omissions or 
custom so long as the issue of their contradiction with the Constitution arises.131 
This has created a judiciary with a very limited role in the formulation, content
126 This does not however mean that courts do not have any role in the enforcement of 
the Constitution. There are several means through which courts can play a role such 
as through interpreting domestic legislation in line with the Constitution or a 
precedent set by the House of Federation.
127 Y. Fisseha, supra note 114, p. 16. Fisseha further indicates that constitutional review 
is not the role of courts in for instance France, England, New Zealand and several 
other countries.
128 M Haile ‘The new Ethiopian Constitution: Its impact upon unity, human rights and 
development’ (1996-1997) 20 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 1 55
129 Ibid, at 54, noting that ‘ordinary courts have no jurisdiction to constitutional issues.
130 Haile similarly notes that the House of Federation is not a judicial body - Haile ‘ 
(supra note 128) 54
131 This means that if the issue is the contravention of administrative acts or custom with 
general principles of administrative law or a proclamation, then it is for the courts to 
determine whether there is such contravention. This is an administrative judicial 
review which should be distinguished from constitutional judicial review which 
essentially depends on the standard against which the constitutionality of any act or 
omission is to be tested.
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and implementation of state policies in Ethiopia.132 Since the HoF is itself a 
political body, all the human rights, including socio-economic rights, provisions 
should be justiciable and the relevance of the ‘political question’ doctrine as 
developed by the US Supreme Court seems less relevant.133
8. Constitutional Remedies
The Ethiopian Constitution does not have a provision that deals with remedies 
that may come out of constitutional dispute resolutions. However, Article 37(1) 
entitles everyone to access courts or other competent bodies to obtain a decision 
or judgment concerning any ‘justiciable matter’.134 The orders and remedies 
will therefore have to be determined by the House of Federation in each case. 
Quite surprisingly, there is no explicit duty on the HoF to declare the invalidity 
of a law or practice inconsistent with the Constitution although the Constitution 
deprives effect to any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state 
or public official in contravention of it.135
The legislation enacted to define the powers of the House, however, has 
some relevant provisions on the effect of its decisions. Any decision and remedy 
applies only prospectively unless otherwise indicated in the decision.136 This is
132 This does not mean that courts have no role in enforcing human rights. Courts can, 
for instance, ensure compliance with human rights that have been declared in 
proclamations, and can ensure the conformity of regulations and directives with the 
enabling proclamations. Courts can also exercise a significant role in interpreting the 
Constitution while determining whether to refer a constitutional issue to the Council 
of Constitutional Inquiry or the House of Federation. Such referral power presents 
for courts the opportunity to undertake preliminary constitutional interpretation. See 
AK Abebe (2010) ‘Towards more liberal standing rules to enforce constitutional 
rights in Ethiopia’ 10(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 401 at 419-420. See 
also Takele Soboka Bulto ‘Judicial referral of constitutional disputes in Ethiopia: 
From practice to theory’ (2011), 19 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 99.
133 For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see P Daly (2010) “Justiciability 
and the ‘political question’ doctrine” Public Law 160.
134 As indicated earlier, there is no clear definition of a ‘justiciable matter’. The South 
African Constitution is very conspicuous in this regard as it grants access to courts in 
relation to ‘any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law’. See section
34.
135 FDRE Constitution, Article 9(1).
136 Proclamation No 251/2001, Art 16(1). Compare the South Africa Constitution 
Section 172(1)(b)(i) which authorizes courts to limit the retrospective effect of the 
declaration of invalidity (without such limitation, the order will have retrospective 
application). - See for instance the case of Occupiers of Olivia Road v City of
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apparently incompatible with Article 9 of the Constitution, which denies effect 
to inconsistent acts or omissions from the beginning (void ab initio), which 
necessitates a retrospective application of remedies.137
The legislation also authorizes the House to grant a grace period of up to six 
months to the Federal or the State legislative body to amend or repeal the law in 
question before a final decision on its unconstitutionality is taken.138 This is a 
novel approach that gives the HoF a rather mediatory role between disputants. 
There is, however, no provision authorizing the suspension of a decision of 
invalidity made by the HoF if it opts to do so for different reasons.139 This 
would have been used, for instance, to avoid legal gaps in the interim between 
declaration of invalidity and adoption of a new or amended legislation through 
giving the legislative body the chance to address the inconsistency that resulted 
in the declaration of invalidity. it is moreover not apparent if the HoF may grant 
any other remedy, such as compensation, than declaring the unconstitutionality 
of the defective act or omission.140
The interpretation of the HoF generally applies on similar constitutional 
matters that may arise in the future.141 Although the decisions of the HoF are 
non-appealable, this should not be understood to preclude the HoF from 
changing or modifying its previous interpretations. The legislation also 
introduces the principle of severability which limits the effect of declaration of 
invalidity to parts of a given law which are inconsistent unless otherwise 
necessary to completely invalidate the whole law.142 Hence, if the rest of the law 
can be given effect without the flawed provision, the law remains valid.
Johannesburg et al Case CCT 24/07[2008] ZACC 1 Para 52 where the 
Constitutional Court excluded retroactive application of its orders.
137 Note that the Constitution says ‘shall be of no effect’ implying that the inconsistent 
act or omission is void ab initio. This requires that parties should be reinstated (by 
applying the remedies retrospectively) to their position prior to the violation to the 
extent possible.
138 Proclamation No 251/2001, art 16(2).
139 The South African Constitutional Court does not have a mediatory role per se. But it 
has the right to suspend its declaration of invalidity whenever considered just and 
equitable - see section 172(1)(b)(ii).
140 This seems to be unlikely as the mere role of the House of Federation or the Council 
of Constitutional inquiry is to ascertain whether the act or omission challenged is 
Constitutional. it is essentially an abstract review that does not require a concrete 
case.
141 Proclamation No 251/2001, Art. 11(1).
142 Proclamation No 251/2001, Article 12. The South Africa Constitution similarly says 
‘invalid to the extent of its inconsistency’ (Section 172(1)(a)).
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the Ethiopian Constitution contains a fairly long list of rights of 
all categories; hence, the main problem in Ethiopia does not seem to be lack of 
human rights guarantees. The interpretation provision of the Ethiopian 
Constitution should apply not only to the provisions in Chapter 3 but also in 
relation to all other provisions relevant to human rights particularly the 
applicability of the derogation provision. The mode of formulation of the socio­
economic rights provisions of the Constitution is, however, problematic. There 
is therefore the need to amend it in the line with the ICESCR. There is also the 
need to clearly provide for possible remedies in the proclamations that regulate 
the powers of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the House of 
Federation. Moreover, there is no formal recognition of the judicial enforcement 
of the human rights provisions of the Constitution. Despite various scholarly 
works suggesting otherwise, the Ethiopian Constitution has kept courts at arm’s 
length from constitutional interpretation. This has diminished the role of 
Ethiopian courts as the ultimate custodians of human rights protected under the 
Constitution and other laws.
in light of international and regional human rights instruments that can be 
used as guides, the House of Federation, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, 
courts, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and other organs which may 
be involved in constitutional interpretation can indeed explore good practices 
from the experience and rich jurisprudence of international, regional and foreign 
jurisdictions in the area of human rights. Meanwhile, any limitation that may be 
imposed on the rights recognized in the Ethiopian Constitution should only be 
accepted when it is justifiable and necessary in accordance with a law (that is 
clear and accessible), and with due regard to the implications for its 
proportionality in a democratic society. _________ ■
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